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metaset({"version":"1.0","encoding":"UTF-8","entry":{"xmlns":"http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom","xmlns$blogger":"http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008","xmlns$georss":"http://www.georss.org/georss","xmlns$gd":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005","xmlns$thr":"http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0","id":{"$t":"tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7030318226622508810.post-567773313207425630"},"published":{"$t":"2016-10-30T23:14:00.000-04:00"},"updated":{"$t":"2016-11-05T04:18:00.114-04:00"},"title":{"type":"text","$t":"Introducing PropOrNot: Identifying \u0026 Combatting Russian Online Propaganda"},"content":{"type":"html","$t":"\u003Cimg src=\"https:\/\/blogger.googleusercontent.com\/img\/b\/R29vZ2xl\/AVvXsEiPduxRtkB0ZR9gkm93hNZBe6BEbti03Kf_B4GBlQywzgAKHw4108oSqEQpdFoL4QDT5WMJhyphenhyphen0ljBM82XFPC2vnrow6EKKufWwxlmpIZeI7CSCzIhHy3nkNOu7wTlSeL7e06aCE-nToR-s\/s1600\/proponot_logo_200x200.png\" style=\"display: none;\" \/\u003E\n\u003Cb\u003EExecutive Summary\u003C\/b\u003E: \u003Ci\u003ERussia’s attempts to influence the US election via hacking and selectively leaking sensitive US government and political data are not being conducted in isolation. They are accompanied by large-scale and long-term efforts to build online propaganda outlets with significant audiences in the US, which we estimate to number in the tens of millions of Americans.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/i\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Ci\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003C\/i\u003E\n\u003Ci\u003EThus far we at PropOrNot have identified over 200 distinct websites which qualify as Russian propaganda outlets according to our criteria, and target audiences in the United States. We estimate the regular US audiences of these sites to number in the tens of millions. We are gathering data to measure that more precisely, but we are confidant that it includes at least 15 million Americans.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/i\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Ci\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\u003C\/i\u003E\n\u003Ci\u003EThe messaging used by these Russian propaganda outlets seems intended to confuse public opinion, encourage paranoia, distract American audiences away from relying on actually-accurate journalism, and influence the upcoming US election, while blunting opposition to and strengthening popular support for Russian strategic priorities - and even going so far as to lay the groundwork for, in the immediate aftermath of the upcoming election, Russian-orchestrated political violence in the US.\u003C\/i\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\nWe at PropOrNot do not reach our conclusions lightly. We have arrived at them after systematically employing a combination of manual and automated analysis of open-source non-classified information, and building on the work of other researchers and journalists, in order to map out a related collection of websites, social media, video, and other outlets, which:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Col\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EInclude official state-owned and semi-official Russian propaganda outlets, such as\u0026nbsp;\u003Ca href=\"http:\/\/www.cjr.org\/feature\/what_is_russia_today.php\"\u003ERT\u003C\/a\u003E,\u0026nbsp;\u003Ca href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2014\/11\/10\/kremlins-sputnik-newswire-is-the-buzzfeed-of-propaganda\/\"\u003ESputnik News\u003C\/a\u003E,\u0026nbsp;\u003Ca href=\"http:\/\/www.stopfake.org\/en\/is-russia-insider-sponsored-by-a-russian-oligarch-with-the-ties-to-the-european-far-right\/\"\u003ERussia Insider\u003C\/a\u003E,\u0026nbsp;etc.;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EConsistently cite official state-owned and semi-official Russian propaganda outlets, including the Russian defense ministry and other official spokespeople, etc.;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EConsistently reuse text directly from official state-owned and semi-official Russian propaganda outlets and government spokespeople, often with minimal or no attribution;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EHave a history of generally echoing the Russian propaganda \"line\", by using themes, arguments, talking points, images, and other content similar to those used by official state-owned and semi-official Russian propaganda outlets;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EHave a history of echoing the Russian propaganda \"line\" in ways unrelated to the purported focus of their branding, and in sequence with (at the same time as, or shortly after) official state-owned and semi-official Russian propaganda outlets;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EQualify as propaganda under a rigorous definition: “A systematic form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specific target audiences for political, ideological, and religious purposes, through the controlled transmission of deceptive, selectively-omitting, and one-sided messages (which may or may not be factual) via mass and direct media channels”;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EHave in many cases already been called out by other fact-checkers, researchers, journalists, debunkers, etc.;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EShare technical “tells”, such as Google Analytics IDs, Amazon affiliate codes, WHOIS data, hosting data, ad-network utilization, SEO techniques, etc., in some cases implicating direct Russian involvement;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003ERefer their audiences to each other, via hyperlinks and other means, at disproportionately high rates;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EAre consistently visited by the same audiences, both directly and via search, demonstrating that those intra-network referrals build “brand loyalty” in their audiences over time;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EAre consistently visited by their audiences after searches for terms which congrue with the Russian propaganda “line”, and are unrelated to the purported focus of their branding;\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EAre categorized as \"similar sites\" by automated services in spite of their purportedly distinct focuses;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EHave content characterized by automated services in ways that are consistently very different from their purported subjects, but align with the Russian propaganda “line”;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EHave content aligning with the \u003Ca href=\"https:\/\/www2.gwu.edu\/~ieresgwu\/assets\/docs\/demokratizatsiya%20archive\/GWASHU_DEMO_12_1\/John%20Dunlop%20Aleksandr%20Dugin's%20Foundations%20of%20Geopolitics.pdf\"\u003E“Eurasianist” philosophy of Alexander Dugin\u003C\/a\u003E;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EInclude specialized sites targeted at a wide range of audiences, including US military veterans, Wall St. finance types, environmentalists, peace activists, racists, conspiracy theorists, political junkies, etc.;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EAppear to be effectively influencing public opinion in significant and very problematic ways, by promoting:\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cul\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EConspiracy theories about and protests against US military exercises,\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EIsolationism\/anti-interventionism generally,\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003ESupport for policies like Brexit, and the breakup of the EU and Eurozone,\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EOpposition to Ukrainian resistance to Russia and Syrian resistance to Assad,\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003ESupport for the anti-vax, anti-Zika spraying, anti-GMO, 9\/11-”truther”, gold-standard, and other related movements;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003C\/ul\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EHave extremely large audiences in the US, such that tens of millions of people appear to use them as primary “news” sources, supplanting actual journalism;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EAppear to be part of a larger “active measures”-style Russian influence operation, which also includes hacking and selectively leaking sensitive US government and political data, along with more-traditional espionage and military activity, intended to:\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cul\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EConfuse public opinion, encourage paranoia and passivity, and distract American audiences away from relying on actually-accurate journalism,\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EBlunt opposition to and strengthen popular support for Russian strategic priorities,\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EInfluence the US election, and\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003ELay the groundwork for orchestrated violence, in the immediate aftermath of the election, against the US government.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003C\/ul\u003E\n\u003C\/ol\u003E\nPlease bear in mind that these characteristics of propaganda outlets are motivation-agnostic. It is not up to us to determine whether the sites we’ve identified are being knowingly directed and paid by Russian intelligence officers (although some of them almost certainly are), or whether the individuals involved even knew they were echoing Russian propaganda at any particular point: If the outlets meet criteria like the ones above, then they are echoing Russian propaganda, have effectively become tools of the Russian intelligence services, and are worthy of further investigation.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\nPlease also note that it is possible that this being effectively addressed by the US government in ways we're unaware of yet, but we have done our due diligence, and this does not seem to be the case. We have had extensive conversations with national security professionals in the legislative branch, executive branch, active and retired, and to a person, none of them are aware of it being addressed by the national security apparatus.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\nOn the contrary, we have been advised that the US government is deliberately and purposely not getting involved, and steering clear of this in order to avoid inadvertantly influencing domestic politics and our democratic process. This has backfired, creating a US government blind spot, and opening an opportunity for a foreign power to do exactly what our government is so carefully trying to avoid doing: Directly manipulate our democratic process.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cspan style=\"font-size: large;\"\u003E\u003Cb\u003EMethodology\u003C\/b\u003E\u003C\/span\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\nWe use a combination of manual and automated analysis, including analysis of content, timing, technical indicators, and other reporting, in order to initially identify (“red-flag”) and then confirm an outlet as Russian propaganda. Our volunteers have developed a suite of software tools, leveraging publicly available data and commercial services, in order to perform automated analysis, but everything we do is in principle replicable using manual searching and data entry.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\nWe initially red-flag a new site based on content-based criteria like those outlined above. Does it:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Col\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EConsistently cite official state-owned and semi-official Russian propaganda outlets?\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EConsistently reuse text directly from official state-owned and semi-official Russian propaganda outlets?\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EHave a history of generally echoing the Russian propaganda \"line\", especially in ways unrelated to the purported focus of their branding, and in sequence with other Russian propaganda outlets?\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EHas it been called out by other fact-checkers, researchers, journalists, and debunkers for posting fake news?\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003C\/ol\u003E\nFrom there we use our software tools to fill in the blanks, collecting a wide range of data about the new target site, and seeing how it fits into the existing network of previously red-flagged and identified outlets. We have built out a significant network of websites, and every time we feel confidant that we have discovered most of them, we keep finding more.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\nIn the process of doing this, we have also identified a significant set of YouTube channels, Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, etc, which are acting as part of the same larger Russian influence operation.\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cspan style=\"font-size: large;\"\u003E\u003Cb\u003EPreliminary Conclusions\u003C\/b\u003E\u003C\/span\u003E\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cbr \/\u003E\nOur initial findings include:\u003Cbr \/\u003E\n\u003Cul\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EThere are well over 200 distinct websites which qualify as Russian propaganda outlets according to our criteria, and target audiences in the United States.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EWe estimate the regular US audiences of these sites to number in the tens of millions. We are gathering data to measure that more precisely, but we are confidant that it includes at least 15 million Americans.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EWe have yet to to analyze at least hundreds more websites, along with numerous more YouTube channels, Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, etc.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EThe US government is fully aware that this is the case.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EThe US government has refrained from publicizing it, primarily to avoid interference in the domestic political process.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003Cli\u003EHowever, this inaction has deprived the American public of information they need to vote in an informed manner, and allowed Russia to manipulate the US domestic political process and interfere in the 2016 election.\u003C\/li\u003E\n\u003C\/ul\u003E\n"},"link":[{"rel":"edit","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/7030318226622508810\/posts\/default\/567773313207425630"},{"rel":"self","type":"application/atom+xml","href":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/feeds\/7030318226622508810\/posts\/default\/567773313207425630"},{"rel":"alternate","type":"text/html","href":"http:\/\/www.propornot.com\/2016\/10\/introducing-propornot-be-aware-of-and.html","title":"Introducing PropOrNot: Identifying \u0026 Combatting Russian Online Propaganda"}],"author":[{"name":{"$t":"X"},"uri":{"$t":"http:\/\/www.blogger.com\/profile\/16401174395512306547"},"email":{"$t":"noreply@blogger.com"},"gd$image":{"rel":"http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail","width":"16","height":"16","src":"https:\/\/img1.blogblog.com\/img\/b16-rounded.gif"}}],"media$thumbnail":{"xmlns$media":"http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/","url":"https:\/\/blogger.googleusercontent.com\/img\/b\/R29vZ2xl\/AVvXsEiPduxRtkB0ZR9gkm93hNZBe6BEbti03Kf_B4GBlQywzgAKHw4108oSqEQpdFoL4QDT5WMJhyphenhyphen0ljBM82XFPC2vnrow6EKKufWwxlmpIZeI7CSCzIhHy3nkNOu7wTlSeL7e06aCE-nToR-s\/s72-c\/proponot_logo_200x200.png","height":"72","width":"72"}}});